University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 1

1979

Government by Judiciary
Philip B. Kurland

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip B. Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 2 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 307 (1979).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
VOLUME 2

1979

NUMBER

2

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
A talk delivered by Philip B. Kurland,* William R. Kenan, Jr.
DistinguishedService Professor, The University of Chicago, at The
Law School of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, on 20
April 1979 at 8:00 P.M.

The phrase that I use for my title, "government by judiciary,"
is generally regarded as pejorative. The question is why should the
words be so readily recognized as deprecatory rather than laudatory,
even by those who applaud the fact even as they deny the inference.
I think the answer lies in a recognition of the illegitimacy of the
broad exercise of judicial power, however much the results are to the
tastes of those who applaud the assumption of authority. The reaction of many to the implicit charge contained in the words
"government by judiciary" must be similar to that expressed by
Professor Louis Lusky in his recently published critique of the work
of the Supreme Court in a volume entitled By What Right? In his
prefatory remarks, he stated:
This has been a very hard book to write. Ever since I became
a lawyer I have revered the United States Supreme Court as the

finest of our institutions - and I still do. The book was begun as
an effort to justify virtually everything the Court has done since
its 1937 rebirth as the citadel of American freedom, equality, and
justice. As I studied and wrote, however, I found that I could not
do what I had planned. Gradually I became convinced that the
Court's record of stunning achievement is significantly flawed. In
the past few years particularly, the Justices have given serious
cause for suspicion that they have come to consider the Court to
be above the law. Like a son who is just discovering his father to
be less than perfect, I was shaken by the deepening suspicion that
my Galahad was a Lancelot.'
* A.B., University of Pennsylvania,1942; LL.B., Harvard University, 1944; Founderand
Editor,THE SUPREME CouRT REVIEW; and authorof numerous works on constitutionallaw and
federal practice.
1. Preface to L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? at vii (1975).
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By What Right? indeed. But the title of my talk properly belongs now to Raoul Berger, who recently published a book by that
name and has been excoriated for doing So. 2 Indeed, I should have
preferred a different title, but that too has been preempted by Pro•fessor Leonard Krieger, whose recent book is called An Essay on the
Theory of Enlightened Despotism.3
My most recently published book is concerned essentially with
problems of separation of powers and is entitled Watergate and the
Constitution. And, I submit, that the issues of Watergate and those
of government by judiciary are, at bottom, the same. The late Professor Alexander M. Bickel wrote frequently and well on the subject
of judicial power, 4 and thus brought down on his head - and incidentally on my own - the wrath of Judge J. Skelly Wright.5 (There
is no want of defenders of judicial activism.) In his posthumously
published volume entitled The Morality of Consent,' Bickel recognized the parallel between the Watergate episode and the exercise
of power by the Supreme Court. He noted that "the Warren Court
got over doctrinal difficulties or issues of the allocation of competence among various institutions by asking what it viewed as a
decisive practical question: If the Court did not take certain action
which was right and good, would other institutions do so, given
7
political realities?"
Bickel went on:
The derogators of procedure and of technicalities, and other
anti-institutional forces who rode high, on the bench as well as off,
were the armies of conscience and of ideology. If it is paradoxical
that they were also the armies of a new populism it is not a paradox
to wonder at . . . . The paradox is that the people whom the
populist exalts may well - will frequently - not vote for the
results that conscience and ideology dictate. But then one can
always hope, or identify the general will with the people despite
2.

R.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTm

(1977). See Brest, Berger v. Brown et al., N. Y. Times Book Review, Dec. 11,
1977, at 10, col. 1; Miller, Do the FoundingFathers Know Best?, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1977,
§ E, at 5, col. 1. See also Berger, Government by Judiciary: Some Countercriticism,56 Tex.
AMENDMENT

L. Rev. 1125 (1978).

3. (1978).
4. See, e.g., A. BICK.L,THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1976); A. BICKEL,
TlE LEAST DANGEROuS BRANCH (1962).

5. Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 769 (1971).
6. (1975).
7. A. BICKEL, THE MoRAITYr

OF CONSENT

120 (1975).
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their votes, and let the Supreme Court bespeak
the people's gen8
eral will when the vote comes out wrong.
He then linked the aggressive grasps for power by the Court
with similar behavior by the Nixon White House:
Here the connection with the attitudes that at least contributed to Watergate is direct. It was utterly inevitable that such a
populist fixation should tend toward the concentration of power in
that single institution which has the most immediate link to the
largest constituency. Naturally the consequence was a Gaullist
presidency, making war, making peace, spending, saving, being
secret, being open, doing what is necessary, and needing no excuse
for aggregating power to itself besides the excuse that it could do
more effectively what other institutions, particularly Congress, did
not do very rapidly or very well, or under particular political circumstances could not do at all. This was a leaf from the Warren
Court's book, but the presidency could undertake to act antiinstitutionally in this fashion with more justification because, unlike the Court, it could claim not only a constituency but the
largest one
The constitutional limits of judicial power - like the constitutional limits of executive power - are not easily defined. From the
very beginning of judicial review, we have been told by our most
eminent jurists that the Constitution is a very different kind of
instrument from all others that are intended to govern people's
conduct. A written constitution is plainly a contract, but not merely
a contract; it is a law, but not merely a law. A constitution purports
to allocate and to limit; it restrains governmental powers. All exercise of governmental power depends on constitutional legitimation.
And so, according to these eminent authorities, the Constitution
must be read neither literally, nor merely in light of the intention
of its authors, nor only in terms of extending its meaning to inhibition of evils of the same kind that it patently purports to abate. For
the jurist and the jurisprudent the question tends to become: what
would I put in the Constitution if I were writing it today?
The judicial language that justifies the expansion of its own
powers from that of a court to that of an amendatory body, a Council of Revision which the framers specifically rejected, ° is familiar.
Thus, in Marbury v. Madison, the great Chief Justice told us: "It
8.
9.

Id. at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
10. See 2 M. FARRAND,
1937).

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, 72-80 (rev. ed.
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is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is."" But at the very same time, Marshall said that
"the framers of the Constitution contemplated that instrument, as
a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature."'"
The first quotation, of course, is more familiar than the second,
because it is so frequently invoked by the courts while the latter is
ignored.
It was just a little later that Marshall asserted: "[W]e must
never forget. . . it is a constitution we are expounding,' 3 and thus
transmuted the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I into a
Hamiltonian grant of unlimited authority to the national government. Felix Frankfurter, near the end of his judicial career, asserted
that this statement by Marshall was "the single most important
utterance in the literature of constitutional law - most important
because most comprehensive and most comprehending."" I suppose
that my apprenticeship to Justice Frankfurter was a failure. For
these words, "we must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding," are as empty of meaning for me as they were full of
significance for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, unless these words mean
what Charles Evans Hughes meant when he said: "The Constitution is what the Justices say it is. ' "5 That is all to the good by way
of description if not by way of legitimation. But even Hughes added
"while careful to maintain its authority as the interpreter of the
Constitution, the Court has not sought to aggrandize itself at the
expense of either executive or legislature,"' 6 which was neither true
nor explanatory.
Mr. Justice Holmes, perhaps Marshall's only rival for the claim
of being the greatest Supreme Court Justice by that amorphous but
pervasive measure of ignorant public opinion, told us, even as he too
stretched the Constitution beyond recognition:
[Wihen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
11.
12.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Id. at 179-80.

13. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
14. KURLAND, E., FEux FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME CouRT 534 (1970).
15. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIrTD STATES 41 (1928).
16. Id.
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nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.7
My, he had a way with words. He made them sound as if they
were full of insight and subtle but controlling truths. But what did
Holmes mean by these words, except that judges will rewrite the
fundamental document to meet what we think are the exigencies of
our time? On the other hand, he also reminded us:
While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no
means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges
who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based
upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for
possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise, a constitution, instead of embodying
only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood
by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan
of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no
means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus. 8
Of course, the framers of the Constitution were not unaware
that times would change and so, too, therefore, would the demands
on the Constitution. That is why they made provision for interstitial
changes, not by the courts but by the legislature. It was to Congress
- not the national government as a whole or any branch of it that the Constitution looked in the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which reads:
The Congress shall have Power. . .To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
The language of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments all charge
the Congress, not the courts, with effectuation of their respective
provisions. The Constitution itself also specified the means for more
fundamental changes by its provisions for constitutional amendments contained in Article V. Again, not by the courts, but by "We
the People of the United States," that is, by the only sovereign
17.
18.
19.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.18.
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recognized by the Constitution. The authors of the basic document
had not yet forgotten that the American Revolution was a political
revolution intended to displace the sovereign crown, his courtiers,
and his judges, too, as the rulers of the nation: to replace them by
a democratic system in which the people were to determine who
shall have what powers of government. Instead, we have come to the
point where the royal fiat has been replaced by the equally arbitrary
fiat of courts and the bureaucracies.
The two patent questions are, what is the justification for the
courts assuming the role of constitution makers and whence they
derive their revisions of the Constitution. The prime argument for
endowing the Court with this power of constitution making is that
of necessity. But with Judge Learned Hand I submit this justification is valid only with regard to the First Amendment. He felt that
the strongest argument for judicial review related to freedom of
speech, where the judicial branch may be in a position to act quickly
and contrary to majority desires:
The most important issues here arise when a majority of the
voters are hostile, often bitterly hostile, to the dissidents against
whom the statute is directed; and legislatures are more likely than
courts to repress what ought to be free. It is true that the periods
of passion or panic are ordinarily not very long, and that they are
usually succeeded by a serener and more tolerant temper; but...
serious damage may have been done that cannot be undone, and
no restitution is ordinarily possible for the individuals who have
suffered. This is a substantial and important advantage of wide
judicial review.0
The arguments for judicial supremacy in other areas are less
cogent. As Hand said:
Judges are perhaps more apt than legislators to take a long view,
but that varies so much with the individual that generalization is
hazardous. We are faced with the ever present problem in all popular government: how far the will of immediate majorities should
prevail. .

.

. [Jiudges are seldom content [however] merely to

annul the particular solution before them; they do not, indeed,
they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the
legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the
contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives
such as "arbitrary," "artificial," "normal," "reasonable,"
"inherent," "fundamental," or "essential," whose office usually,
though quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and
20.

L. HAND, THE Bni OF RGHS 69 (1958).
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impute to it a derivation far more impressive than their personal
preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision. If we
do need a third chamber it should appear for what it is, and not
as the interpreter of inscrutable principles."
"Aye, there's the rub." The reason that "government by judiciary" sounds in the pejorative is because it contradicts the judiciary's representation about itself. "Upon what meat doth this our
Caesar feed, That he is grown so great?" Where, if not in the words
of the constitution, if not in the original intent of the framers, if not
in precedent, if not in reason adequate to explain its conclusions,
does the Court find the makings of its revisions?
Manyjudges have acknowledged that with them judgment precedes the reasons for their judgment. Having reached their conclusions, they then seek to justify them. But on what grounds? We have
a new emergence of notions of natural law, a higher law than the
Constitution, which the courts, like Vestal Virgins, assure us to be
the Truth. The demand for reason rather than insight is rejected,
as William James would have rejected it, as "The Sentiment of
4
Rationality."
If judges do not seek to rationalize their conclusions until after
they have rendered them, why the gross waste of effort in affording
fictive justifications? If the judgment comes with the help of reasoning, can there be a purpose in providing the reasoning? William
James quotes from a Professor Bain - whose name, it must be
admitted has not gone down among the major scientists of our time:
"Our only error is in proposing to give any reason or justification for5
2
the postulate, or to treat it as otherwise than begged at the outset. 1
Speaking of the world of science in words familiar to the world
of law, James himself wrote:
The coil is about us, struggle as we may. The only escape from
faith is mental nullity. What we enjoy in a Huxley or a Clifford is
not the professor with his learning, but the human personality
ready to go in for what it feels to be right, in spite of all appearances. The concrete man has but one interest, - to be right. That
for him is the art of all arts, and all means are fair which help him
to it. Naked he is flung into the world, and between him and nature
there are no rules of civilized warfare. The rules of the scientific
21.
22.
23.
1971).
24.
25.

Id. at 69-70.
W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET I:1:65 (G.L. Kittredge and I. Ribkin, eds. 1971).
W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR 1:2:149-50 (G.L. Kittredge and I. Ribkin, eds.
THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES 317 (McDermott, ed., 1978).
Id. at 334.
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game, burdens of proof, presumptions, experimenta crucis, complete inductions, and the like, are only binding on those who enter
that game. As a matter of fact we all more or less do enter it,
because it helps us to our end. But if the means presume to frustrate the end and call us cheats for being right in advance of their
slow aid, by guesswork or by hook or crook what shall we say of
them? . . .
In short, if I am born with such a superior general reaction to
evidence that I can guess right and act accordingly, and gain all
that comes of right action, while my less gifted neighbor (paralyzed
by -his scruples and waiting for more evidence which he dares not
anticipate, much as he longs to) still stands shivering on the brink,
by what law shall I be forbidden to reap the advantages of my
superior sensitiveness?"
There are questions to ask of those who behave as pragmatically
as James suggested they should, when they are behaving as judges.
Can they all be such geniuses as William James supposed himself
to be? Does the presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate certify to that condition? Or is this simply an
arrogation to oneself, a display of naked power, implicitly granted
by the President's nomination and the Senate's confirmation?
One might think that the rejection of reason is simply a reflection of our contemporary zeitgeist. Surely we have enough contemporary philosophers who tell us that reason is a myth and feeling,
emotional not tactile, is the only guide to truth. But again the
question becomes, why pretend? I submit that for a court to pretend
that it is only a medium through which the spirit of the laws convey
their meaning demeans both expositor and auditor. Yet, despite the
teachings of the jurisprudential realists, courts continue to adhere
to the proposition that the mandates they hand down are not theirs
but come from higher authority.
These representations become less and less credible as the reasoning from the language of the allegedly controlling document whether Constitution or statute or judicial precedent - becomes
more and more attenuated. None today believes that Apollo communicated to the Greeks through the Delphic oracles. So, too, is it
generally recognized that courts - whatever they say - are more
of the school of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass,
making words mean what they want them to mean; that the courts
are the masters and not the servants of the words they purport to
invoke as guides to judgment.
26.

Id. at 335.
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What then does it mean to speak of judicial adventure beyond
its defined ken? On that subject I have promised - or threatened
- a book, which I have already entitled "The Reign of Error."
Today I would merely adumbrate a small portion of what I will spell
out later. Let me catalogue a few of the symptoms of the disease of
judicial government.
The primary symptom is revealed not only by recent judicial
behavior but by that which has occurred in earlier periods about
which there is no question now but that the courts exceeded their
province. It is the one to which I have already adverted. It is the
abuse of power of judicial review, with a resulting subordination of
the other branches of government, state and federal, legislative and
executive.
These periods of judicial activism are marked by the substitution of ideology for constitutional language and history, and of shibboleths for reasons. I think that we now recognize that the invocation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
Nine Old Men was an excuse rather than a reason for social legislation of the 1920s and 1930s. "Freedom of contract" was a phrase
added to the Constitution, not derived from it, to create the ideology
of substantive due process. So, too, must we recognize that the
invocation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
-

and especially what is called their "penumbras" -

has served

the same purpose for contemporary courts as the Due Process
Clause did for the earlier period. And phrases such as "the right to
travel," "chilling effects," "fundamental rights" are, like "freedom
of contract," labels stating conclusions rather than reasons for these
conclusions.
The primary difference between the activism that was decried
by Louis Boudin in his book, also entitled Government by
Judiciary," and Robert H. Jackson, in his book The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy,2 on the one hand, and the activism of today,
on the other, is that the courts of the earlier period acted only to
forestall governmental action, while the new judicial authority encompasses commands for government action.
This shift from the negative to the positive is not a small difference. For we are gradually reaching the point, as a result, where
whatever it is that the Constitution does not forbid is being held to
be constitutionally compelled. There is a diminishing area both for
the citizen and for the other branches of government in which they
27.
28.

(1932).
(1941).
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are free to operate without judicial mandate.
Both the earlier courts and the present ones are acting on behalf
of a particular clientele, largely self-selected by the judges. It may
be said of both, what Harlan Fiske Stone said of the earlier courts
in the 1930s:
[Tihe experience of the past one hundred and fifty years has
revealed the danger that, through judicial interpretation, the constitutional device for the protection of minorities from oppressive
majority action, may be made the means by which the majority is
subjected to the tyranny of the minority. It was the lasting contribution of Justice Holmes that he saw clearly that the danger arose,
not from the want of appropriate formulas for the exercise of the
judicial function, but from the judicial distrust of the democratic
process, and from the innate tendency of the human mind to apply
subjective rather than objective tests to the reasonableness of legislative action."'
Still another symptom of judicial government was described by
Stone when he wrote that "the Court's setting aside of the plain
command of Congress, without reference to any identifiable prohibition of the Constitution, and with only the support of platitudinous
irrelevancies is a matter of transcendental importance." 3° The huge
number of recent opinions that can be described as justified only by
"platitudinous irrelevancies" affords an index of judicial expansiveness.
The essential justification for this kind of judicial legislation
cannot be found in the words of the Constitution. They may be
found, however, in such words as those of the late Alexander Meiklejohn, when he wrote:
[L]ike most revolutionaries, the Framers could not foresee the
specific issues which would arise as their "novel idea" exercised its
domination over the governing activities of a rapidly developing
nation in a rapidly and fundamentally changing world. In that
sense, the Framers did not know what they were doing. And in the
same sense, it is still true that, after two centuries of experience,
we do not know what they were doing, or what we ourselves are
doing."
Meiklejohn seems to be invoking the Christian spirit in defense of
the courts: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they
32
do.'
29.
30.
31.
245, 264.
32.

Quoted in A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 331 (1956).
Id. at 421.
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Luke 23:34 (King James).
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Let me invoke an authority whose thoughts
be labelled as J. Skelly Wright once labelled
mine. 3 Archibald Cox is certainly as stalwart
judiciary's expansive functions as may be found
constitutionalists. Yet, this is what he had to
Lectures at Oxford in 1975:

and efforts cannot
Alex Bickel's and
a defender of the
among respectable
say in his Chicele

Has the Judicial Branch overexpanded its role in American
government and overpoliticized the process of constitutional
adjudication? Nearly all the rules of constitutional law written by
the Warren Court relative to individual and political liberty,
equality, and criminal justice, impress me as wiser and fairer than
the rules they replace. I would support nearly all as important
reforms if proposed in a legislative chamber or a constitutional
convention. In appraising them as judicial rulings, however, I find
it necessary to ask whether an excessive price was paid by enlarging the sphere and changing the nature of constitutional adjudication. The changes made in governmental institutions today may
affect the results tomorrow by reducing the effectiveness of the
institutions and the justice of their determinations ...
Two institutional worries result from recent activism in constitutional adjudication. First, there is the concern that the Court
may sacrifice the power of legitimacy that attaches to decisions
within the traditional judicial sphere rendered on the basis of conventional legal criteria, and so may disable itself from performing
the narrower but none the less vital constitutional role that all
assign to it. Second, there is the fear that excessive reliance upon
courts instead of self-government through democratic processes
may deaden a people's sense of moral and political responsibility
for their own future, especially in matters of liberty, and may stunt
the growth of political capacity that results from the exercise of the
34
ultimate power of decision.

A part of the disease of judicial government is also to be recognized by the principal method by which the legislative will is frustrated by the judiciary. This has been largely accomplished in periods of judicial expansionism by reversing, explicitly or implicitly,
the presumption of validity of legislative action. By presuming invalidity where government action threatens to impinge on their
clients' interests, the courts make defense of the legislative act all
but impossible. Instead of requiring a demonstration that the legislature has overreached its constitutional limits, the burden is put
on the legislature, not only to show that the acts it has indulged are
33.

34.

Wright, supra note 5.
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE

SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 102-03

(1976).
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constitutional, but that they are more constitutional than any of the
possible alternatives available to them.
The label "suspect classification" - applicable only where the'
courts choose to make it applicable - is a determinant of a result
and not the reason for reaching it. It may be that requiring proof of
validity of the exercise of national power would be in keeping with
the original concept of the national government as a government of
limited powers. But such a rationale cannot suffice to justify the
reversal of the presumption of validity with regard to state government. Yet it is more often the latter rather than the former that fall
subject to judicial whippings.
Still another mark of judicial hegemony can be quickly noticed
here. It is the reduction of the constitutional requirement of case
and controversy as a condition for admission to the federal courts.
We have almost arrived at the point that anybody can sue anyone
for anything. The growth of standing for parties without interests,
if not disinterested parties, is always patent at times of judicial
expansionism. I would refer you to Mr. Justice Brandeis's classic
concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority35 for an
attempt to bring courts back to their proper business in 1936. The
most egregious form that this invasion of the legislative province
takes is the friendly lawsuit, wherein a plaintiff sues a defendant in
order to lay down rules that will bind third persons not parties to
the action. An example of recent moment may be found in the suit
by NAACP and others against HEW in order to have regulations
issued which will bind those whom either NAACP or HEW will have
occasion to sue in the future, in this case the colleges and universities of southern states. Like many friendly suits, this one ended in
a consent decree adversely affecting none but the absent victims.
The decree provided for regulations sanctioned by the court but
without legislative provenance whatsoever. Whether the recently
filed Sears suit will be equally effective to this end remains to be
seen.
Two more of the marks of judicial imperialism and I am done
for the nonce. The first is the expansive growth of the injunction as
the essential means for judicial government. Again the indicia are
not merely of contemporary origin. The trail from In re Debs36 in
1895 is a very long one. The specific use of the injunction against
labor organizations was ultimately restrained - if not always suc35.
36.

297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936).
158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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cessfully - by removing federal jurisdiction to undertake such injunctions. But the injunction remains the primary means for a court
to substitute itself for a legislature in creating new laws. Thus, what
was written in 1922 remains true today: "For the moment we know
of no more pressing need for the country's wellbeing than the restoration of confidence in our courts and respect for law through the
abandonment of the abuses of the injunction." 37 The injunction is
consistently used today as it was a half century ago to prevent the
legislative will from being effected until the courts are satisfied that
the legislation meets with judicial approbation, i.e., that it aids, or
at least does not harm, the judicial clientele.
The final symbol of judicial government that I shall mention
here is the utilization of judicial discretion as a justification for
judicial action. In 1949, Felix Frankfurter wrote of the Supreme
Court: "We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice
according to considerations of individual expediency." 3 8 He was
probably inaccurate in his description then; his proposition is certainly inappropriate now. By resort to the measure of the Chancellor's foot, the courts do in fact act like kadis, although they sit in
more regal chambers than the foot of a tree would afford.
In their resort to judicial discretion as the standard for judgment, the courts are essentially rejecting the essence of the rule of
law. The rule of law contemplates that the same standards of conduct will be applied to all persons who come before it. That is what
"equal justice under law," carved in stone over the entrance to the
marble palace, once purported to mean. But the invocation of judicial discretion is a resort to ad hoc rules applicable only to the
instant case before the court and nowhere else. It is simply an excuse
for affording no justification for a court's behavior except that the
court willed it so.
There are other stigmata of judicial overreaching for power. But
suffice it here to say that I do not regard the expansiveness of judicial power to be due solely to the imperial whims of the judiciary.
The craving of the public to take every disagreement to litigation is
limited only by the cost of that litigation. Where the costs are nominal or nonexistent, you may well expect that very large numbers of
persons are willing to make the investment. The increased authority
of the judiciary is a direct response to the requests of a new line of
consumers for the judicial product.
37.
38.

14 at 108.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949).
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Moreover, for many years - since the arrival of the service
state that brought an end to the Nine Old Men - it has been part
of the Congressional creed that if you throw enough money at any
given social problem, it will go away. Experience has taught us that
the recalcitrance of social problems is not so easily reduced. But the
methodology has not been abandoned. Instead, Congress has added
to its remedial armory, by assuming that these insoluble problems
should be addressed by throwing them at the courts for resolution.
Alas, the courts are no more capable of resolving most of them than
was the United States Treasury. The infallibility of the judiciary in
the eyes of Congress, however, remains untarnished.
We may hope that, before it is too late, the courts will abandon
their function as the rulers and administrators of society and return
to their duties as resolvers of disputes and moderators of the excesses of the other branches of government. The concept of judicial
government in a democracy is bound to fail. It will fail for many
reasons.
It will fail, even as its most ardent proponents have recognized,
because the judiciary has neither the resources nor the talents necessary to impose its will on society. It will fail because its appeal is
not to the rule of law but to idiosyncratic preferences that are anything but universal. The courts will fail their legislative function
even as they are now failing their judicial function. Expending their
time on the creation of ever more new rules for society's governance,
they have less and less time to resolve the disputes to which the
rules are to be applied. Controversies between citizen and citizen,
person and person, are now being relegated, first to "peoples'
courts," where neither legal rules nor legal personnel have any role,
and second to compulsory arbitration. In both these places, the
essential and constitutional concept of procedural due process is an
anomaly.
Nor is the judicial burden likely to be dispelled by adding new
judges to the bench. They will afford only a temporary respite. For,
in our litigious society, the court traffic, like that of our cities' superhighways, will grow faster than the means for handling it can be
supplied.
Government by judiciary will fail for a more basic reason. Its
success will mean failure, a failure akin to those suffered by the
other branches of government. Government by judiciary will fail
even as it succeeds, because its present success not only exalts autocracy over democracy, it exalts faction over society, equality over
liberty, the mass and the class over the individual, and even mindlessness over reason. All that makes democracy the preferred form
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of government - if only in its ideal - is put at hazard by judicial
government. And so, if it succeeds, it will fail, however gloriously,
certainly tragically.
I say that the concept of government by judiciary will fail tragically. And for this, I would invoke my colleague Professor James
Redfield's arguments about "the tragedy of Hector. ' 31 Redfield
could have been speaking of the federal judiciary when he wrote of
Hector:
Hector has been overtaken by the disease diagnosed by Thucydides: "Hope and desire, one pushing and the other pulling...
do the greatest harm . . . . And chance also counsels them to
[take] . . . risks with inferior resources . . . . Each man, supported by the rest, has an exaggerated opinion of himself."'
Therein lies the disease.
Herein lies the tragedy:
The tragic hero does not engage our affections merely because his
needs outrun his resources, or his problems their solutions. The
hero's drama is, at least in part, internal to himself, and his failure
is a failure of self-knowledge and self-definition. Our pity and terror are evoked partly by the realization that virtue can be inadequate to circumstance, but they are evoked much more deeply by
the realization that virtue itself is not immune to circumstance,
that in action it can turn to vice. . . . The dilemmas of the hero
are enactments of the contradictory cultural setting in which he
finds himself. In our most abstract description of it, we can describe Hector's error as an enactment of the contradiction between
the two heroisms: altruistic and egotistic.'
To say that government by judiciary will fail calls for no exultation, even by those who deplore it, because there is no way of knowing what will succeed if The last time the judiciary was forced to
retreat, in 1937, we were left with the seeds of the imperial presidency.' 2 This time the bureaucracy, without legislative, presidential, or judicial oversight, may well be the "rough beast" whose
"hour has come round at last." But if so, it will be because the
judiciary has abandoned the role assigned to it by the Constitution,
the role of the vital "centre," which must "hold" if we are to have
a free society. Alas, we have lost what Learned Hand referred to as
the spirit of moderation which is the essence of such a free society. :
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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Perhaps had I been kind to you and to myself, I should have
avoided saying all that I have said and read to you instead a single
paragraph from Edward H. Levi's recent Herman Phleger Lecture
at Stanford. He opened his talk this way:
This is a time of churning of ideas in and about the law.
Events test the balance among institutions and values. The churning is helped by the tendency of basic concepts and propositions
in the law to expand at the expense of others - given half a
chance. The changing reach of the law is part of this picture. The
grasp of government, therefore of law, is more extensive. The judicial system has increased its sovereignty. We are in a time which
might be called the courtification of America. Lawyers, always
important in our history, have become more so. As Judge Friendly
has written, "members of the bar are attracted to judicial review
with a fervor reminiscent of goats in rut." Perhaps in reaction to a
loss of faith, a new assertion of moral rights, has emerged. The
assertion of moral rights is perhaps also a sign of the responsiveness
of our institutions to ward off what Alexander Bickel termed "a
politics of moral attack," even though the assertion was part of
that politics. In any event, this not surprising echo of a natural law
theme was preceded by, and has been accompanied by, the increasing influence of judicial determinations of fairness imposed
on relationships and used as governing device over institutions.
44
These tendencies are not new. But they are enlarged.
Let me end on a lighter note, with a quotation of an old saw
from a letter by Dean Acheson to a United States Senator:
I saw you were in town briefly to hear about the President's
travel plans and that you said he would be accompanied by our
prayers. I am willing to join in your statement on the ground that
I feel about the future of the United States whenever the President
starts out on his travels the way the Marshal of the Supreme Court
does when he opens a session of that Court. You will recall he ends
up his liturgy by saying: "God save the United States for the Court
5
'

is now sitting." '
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